Vol.538 域外法学 | 《法哲学与社会哲学论丛》（ARSP）第105卷（2019）第3期
《法哲学与社会哲学论丛》
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie
Vol. 105 · 2019 · Issue 3
《法哲学与社会哲学论丛》（Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie）由国际法哲学与社会哲学协会（IVR）出版发行。自1907年创刊以来，期刊注目于社会生活、法律文化及其交互作用的智识基础，进而开展法哲学基础研究。期刊接纳所有的当下思想学派，并尤为注重国际视野。同侪评审的程序保证了刊文的高学术水准。
《法哲学与社会哲学论丛》现任主编为乌尔弗里德·诺依曼（Ulfrid Neumann），德国法兰克福大学法哲学、法社会学、刑法和刑事诉讼法学教授，国际法哲学与社会哲学协会前主席（2011-2015），拉德布鲁赫基金会主席。
《法哲学与社会哲学论丛》第105卷（2019）第3期共刊载7篇论文与4篇书评，以下为论文摘要与书评信息：
一
论文摘要
1
《法的说服力与法律实践》
Die Überzeugungskraft des Rechts und die juristische Praxis
Andreas Kerkemeyer
法律不能确保其遵守，因为法律文本本身虽然具有拘束力（binding），但缺乏强制力（forceless）。大多数法律理论都将法律的强制力植根于国家对法律的强制执行或对规范的适切证成。正如此处将要论证的那样，这些描述并未提供令人满意的框架以充分解释为何法律通常“象征性地有效（symbolically effective）”。本文将展示“司法场域（juridical field）”（布尔迪厄）如何在实践中促进对法律的接受。因此，本文旨在分析“司法场域”内的实践。这使我们能够推断出一些促成法律之强制力的机制，同时又不致丧失对法律与权力结构之间错综复杂关系的关注。
Law cannot ensure its adherence, as the legal text itself is binding but forceless. Most legal theories root the force of law either in its enforcement by the state or in the proper justification of norms. As will be argued here, these descriptions do not provide a satisfactory framework to fully explain why law, in general, is “symbolically effective”. It will be shown how the “juridical field” (Bourdieu) is able to contribute to the acceptance of law in practice. The aim of this article therefore is to analyze the practice within the “juridical field”. This enables us to extrapolate some mechanisms that contribute to the force of law while not losing focus on law’s ambivalent entanglement with power structures.
2
《权力与批判》
Macht und Kritik
Hans Friesen
在反思权力（power）与批判（critique）的关系时，也就发生了涉及个体与社会之间关系的变化。对霍克海默和阿多诺而言，生产性的变化（productive change）可以单独存在于不再被视为可能的整体变化；而对福柯来说，来自个体的批判性与生产性的变化已经不再是可想象的，因为在现代世界中，它开始于所有个体的社会化生产。结果是，这两种方式都不再能够展现出一种有意地调和与改变的实体。由于预设了一种个体与社会之间生产性的日常生活，现象学家伯恩哈德·瓦尔登菲尔斯超越了这两种方式。然而结果他也使自己陷入了论证的困难。最后，哈贝马斯将展现一种解决个体与社会之关系的替代方案。那就是可以使个体与社会合理地联系起来的语言。
Reflecting on the relationship between power and critique, a change takes place concerning the relationship between the individual and society. While for Horkheimer and Adorno productive change could consist solely in a change of the whole that is no longer considered possible, for Foucault critical and productive change from the individual is no longer conceivable, because in the modern world it starts from a social production of all individuals. As a result, both approaches are no longer able to present a willfully mediating and changing entity. The phenomenologist Bernhard Waldenfels goes beyond these two approaches because he presupposes a productive everyday life between the individual and society. However, it turns out that he gets himself in justification difficulties. Finally, Habermas will present an alternative approach to the dimension between the individual and society. It is the language by which the individual and society can be reasonably related.
3
《欧根·埃利希的法社会学和宪法》
Die Rechtssoziologie von Eugen Ehrlich und das Verfassungsrecht
Marcos Augusto Maliska
多元主义是21世纪宪法所面临的主要挑战之一，其发展已经偏离了宪法的现实。现代宪法在历史上与民族国家的概念相联系，民族国家是一个由同质社会组成的政治共同体，在这个社会中，公民分享相同的历史、荣誉、英雄和语言，并有强烈的相互归属感。21世纪的社会则与此模式不同，因为它们由混杂的族群组成，他们通常既不分享共同的历史，也没有共同的英雄和语言。在这些社会，就社会组织的基础问题存在着不同的观点，公民有着不同的世界观和生活方式。虽然欧根·埃利希生活在19世纪末20世纪初，但是他工作于象征着多样性的布科维纳地区。因此，相比于身处欧洲法律文化的中心地带，埃利希更有机会以一种不同的方式来思考法律。埃利希对形成于布科维纳诸多社群中“活法（living law）”的观察，使其得以发展出一种非常特殊的、具有不同范畴的法律理论。埃利希的作品为法律多元主义与宪法的协调提供了机会。在此过程中，活法和社团是两个核心概念，但法律规范（legal norm）和法律命令（legal precept）之间的区别同样有价值，因为法律效力在这一法律的双重维度中起着关键作用。这种法律形式从根本上影响着实在法，尤其是在冲突的情况下。然而，法律作为一种通常行为的秩序，也可以通过其实效获得效力。
Pluralism is one of the key challenges of constitutional law in the 21st century. It has been developed away from the reality of constitutional law. Modern constitutional law is historically linked to the concept of the nation-state, a political community formed by a homogenous society in which citizens share the same history, glory, hero and language, and feel a strong mutual sense of belonging. The 21st century societies are different from this model because they are made up of a heterogeneous population that often does not share a common history, nor have the same heroes and language. These are societies in which opinions differ on fundamental issues of social organization and citizens have different worldviews and lifestyles. Although Eugen Ehrlich lived in the late 19th century and early 20th century, he worked in a region, Bukovina, which was a symbol of diversity. Thus, Ehrlich had the opportunity to consider the law in a different way than was possible in the great centers of European legal culture. His observations of the living law of the various communities that had formed in Bukovina enabled Ehrlich to develop a very particular theory of law with different categories. The work of Ehrlich offers the opportunity to harmonize legal pluralism with constitutional law. Living law and association are two central concepts in this process, but just as valuable is the distinction between legal norm and legal precept, because legal validity makes a major difference in this double dimension of law. The legal form fundamentally influences empirical law, especially in cases of conflict. However, law as an order of ordinary behavior also has validity through its effect.
4
《默克尔对凯尔森法律解释理论的贡献》
Merkls Beitrag zu Kelsens Theorie der Rechtsauslegung
Matheus Pelegrino Da Silva
本文分析阿道夫·尤里乌斯·默克尔对汉斯·凯尔森法律解释理论的贡献。首先讨论的是，凯尔森之作为描述性学科的法律科学概念对默克尔的法律解释理论之影响的可能延展。默克尔和凯尔森在法律解释概念上的许多共同之处将被识别与展现出来，随后指出的是这些概念之间的歧异。应予强调的是，在默克尔的解释理论中，可以发现语法-逻辑解释（grammatical-logical interpretation）和文义法律解释（literal legal interpretation）之间存在着区别。基于这些层面以及默克尔在许多特定主题上的论述，凯尔森的法律解释理论吸收了默克尔于此的诸多想法。
This paper analyzes Adolf Julius Merkl’s contributions to Hans Kelsen’s theory of legal interpretation. Initially the possible extension of the influence of Kelsen’s conception of legal science as a descriptive discipline on Merkl’s theory of legal interpretation is discussed. The many common aspects between Merkl’s and Kelsen’s conceptions of legal interpretation are identified and presented and after that the dissonances and differences between these conceptions are indicated. It is highlighted that in Merkl’s theory of interpretation there is a distinction to be found, between the grammatical-logical interpretation and the literal legal interpretation. Based on the presentation of these aspects and on the indication of Merkl’s texts on many specific topics it is argued that Kelsen’s theory of legal interpretation incorporated many of Merkl’s ideas on the matter.
5
《参与者视角与法律陈述学说：
一种存疑的关系》
Teilnehmerperspektive und Rechtssatzlehre: Eine problematische Beziehung
David Kuch
H. L. A. 哈特的《法律的概念》因提出了法律的内在观点与外在观点的划分而闻名。德国的作者们经常为了区分“规范性的”与“描述性的”法律陈述而提到同样的划分。这篇文章旨在反对这样一种对哈特的理论的解读：尽管以此种方式解读《法律的概念》或许是有根据的，但是哈特后来修正和改变了他的立场。于此我将解释这些变化的理由。它们反映了对法律话语（discourse）本质的重要洞察。根据哈特最终的概念（受到尼尔·麦考密克和约瑟夫·拉兹的影响），法律陈述可以是“规范的”但也“超然的（detached）”。就此而言，一个法律陈述的表达并不使言说者忠于它所表达的规范性观点。
The Concept of Law by H. L. A. Hart is well known for drawing the distinction between an internal and an external point of view towards the law. German authors often refer to the same distinction in order to separate “normative” from “descriptive” legal statements. This article argues against such a reading of Hart’s theory: Though it might be justified to interpret The Concept of Law this way, Hart modified and refined his position later. The reasons for these changes are explained here. They reveal important insights into the nature of legal discourse. According to Hart’s final conception (influenced by Neil MacCormick and Joseph Raz) legal statements may be “normative” but “detached”. In this case, the utterance of a legal statement does not commit the speaker to the normative view it expresses.
6
《悲剧案件：没有正确答案吗？—— 一种基于罗伯特·阿列克西法哲学的进路》
Tragic Cases: No correct answer? An approach according to the Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy
Cláudia Toledo
基于曼努埃尔·阿蒂安札（他是尤其着眼于本议题的法学家之一）与罗伯特·阿列克西（其著作在当代法哲学中广被引用）的论述，本文旨在分析悲剧案件（tragic cases）的概念及其不同含义。根据阿列克西所展示的参数（正确性、合理性、法律论证、人权），阿蒂安札关于悲剧案件的某些核心主张（缺乏正确答案，法律合理性限制、选择更少的恶）于此被证明是不可接受的。基于阿列克西的著作，证成关于悲剧案件（也即是，存在不止一种正确答案，并且这些答案彼此相悖的案件）的相反结论是可能的。
The aim of the current article is to analyze the concept of tragic cases and its different implications based on Manuel Atienza, one of the jurists who specially addressed the issue, and on Robert Alexy, whose work is one of the main references in contemporary Legal Philosophy. According to parameters exposed by Alexy (correctness, rationality, legal argumentation, human rights), some of Atienza’s central assertions about tragic cases (lack of correct answer, legal rationality limitation, option for the lesser evil) are herein demonstrated as inadmissible. Based on Alexy’s work, it is possible to justify the opposite conclusion about tragic cases, i. e., cases where there is more than one correct answer and these answers are opposed to each other.
7
《平等的结构——或所谓“免于歧视之构成要件”的难题》
Die Struktur der Gleichheit – oder die Problematik der sog. "diskriminierungsfreien Tatbestände"
Dieter Krimphove
时至今日，平等的现象——因此也包括其巩固为一种自主的（autonomous）权利，也即是平等或平等对待的人权——在理论与实践中显现出重大难题。正如莱尼布茨所表明的，“平等”一词并非可以顾名思义地去理解。为了不混淆现象间的“平等（equality）”与“相同（identity）”，需要一种实质性的（判断性的）矫正（corrective）。如果不想混淆二者，关于平等的决定总是要求进一步的评价因素。法律人通过实行构成“他们的”平等观的实证标准（例如年龄、性别与种族），来在他们的法律体系中实用主义地解决这一要求。然而，即使是这种实用的实证方式也有其缺陷。如果并不属于前述实证范畴的标准（例如：身体缺陷、经济能力不足、教育水平低下）打开了在法律上歧视（discriminate）相关人员的可能性，问题就产生了。这些未列举的“差别”已经不属于平等对待的范畴。因此，它们在结构上并不满足平等/无差别的要求。由于这种差别并非非歧视性规范（non-discrimination norm）的要素，它们的正当化（legitimation）甚至不要求一种围绕正当性（legitimacy）而开展的法律检验或证成。这种见解引起若干仍然有待解决或未被充分讨论的问题。通过在各式各样的“差别因素”中展示出“平等对待”，它们可以被解决。除了关于这些特征之证成的公开社会问题，国家平等权利与其它可能是更高位阶的法律规范（例如人权）之间的若干相容性问题必须在这种法律语境中予以考虑。考虑到将平等赋予某人相应地意味着另一个人自由的减损，一种面向自由权的更为不同的平等观看起来是有益的。
Up to the present, the phenomenon of equality - and thus its consolidation into an autonomous right, namely the human right of equality or equal treatment -manifests serious problems in theory and practice. As Leibniz exhibited, “equality” is not purely understandable on its own terms. In order to not confuse the phenomena’s “(e)quality” with “identity”, a substantive (judgmental) corrective is required. If one does not want to confuse equality with identity, the determination of equality always requires a further evaluative element. Legal professionals solve this requirement in their legal systems pragmatically by implementing positivistic criterions, such as age, sex, race, that constitute “their” conception of equality in their law. However, even this pragmatic positivist approach has its shortcomings. The question arises, if the criterions, that are not part of the above mentioned positivistic catalogue [e. g.: physical ugliness, low property or financial position, low educational level] open the possibility to legally discriminate affected people. Such non-listed ‘discriminations’ already drop out of the scope of the equal treatment catalogue. Hence, they do structurally not meet the requirement of equality/non-discrimination. As this kind of discrimination does not fulfil the element of the non-discrimination norm, their legitimation does even not require a legal examination or justification of its legitimacy by a justification test. This contribution raises a number of questions that are still unanswered or sufficiently discussed. They could be solved, amongst others, by opening up “equal treatment” for a variety of “elements of discrimination”. In addition the open social questions about the justification of such characteristics, a number of aspects of the compatibility of national equality rights with other, possibly higher-ranked, legal norms - e. g. Human Rights - must be considered in this legal context. Considering that the granting of equality of one person regularly implies the loss of the freedom of another person, a more differentiated view of equality - oriented towards the rights of freedom - seems to be beneficial.
二
书评
1. Oliver Lepsius评François Ost的《权利有什么用？——用途、功能和目的》（À quoi sert le droit? Usages, fonctions, finalités）；
2. Carsten Bäcker评Philipp Gisbertz的《英美法哲学中的人格尊严：与欧陆法哲学的比较研究》（Menschenwürde in der angloamerikanischen Rechtsphilosophie. Ein Vergleich zur kontinentaleuropäischen Rechtsphilosophie）；
3. Karl-Heinz Ladeur评Eric Hilgendorf与Jan C. Joerden编著的《法哲学手册》（Handbuch Rechtsphilosophie）；
4. Piero Marra评Antonio Incampo与Wojciech Żełaniec编著的《惩罚的普遍性》（Universality of Punishment）。
法律思想｜中国政法大学法理学研究所